The most surprising thing about the arrest of FIFA officials on corruption charges is that it finally happened. Anyone who has paid even a skerrick of attention to soccer's governing body over the years would see that there are deeply suspicious practices within the organisation. The 2018 and 2022 World Cup decisions, which to most observers seemed fairly obviously decided through means other than merit (particularly in the case of Qatar) seemed to push the majority into believing FIFA was very corrupt, rather than mildly so.
FIFA is hardly alone amongst sports governing bodies in terms of corruption or poor management charges, so much so that such things seem like the norm, rather than the exception.
We know that corruption is bad - otherwise, we would not call it corruption - and yet it seems to seep into sports so easily that we should really be asking if such things genuinely matter.
Consider the soccer World Cup. Or rather, the FIFA World Cup. FIFA, an organisation we know is corrupt, makes hundreds of millions of dollars from each of these events. It also earns millions more from all the other tournaments it runs, and from the bodies associated with it. It has unquestioned control over the biggest sport in the world. It is clear that the soccer-watching public care more about their sport than they do about the reputation of the body in charge of it.
Perhaps this is because the corruption doesn't appear to be directly affecting the game. While there are always murmurs of fixing for major sporting events, the reality is that the corruption in question tends to relate to things around the matches, not the matches themselves. For the average fan, this means it simply doesn't matter to them that much. Why should the average fan worry about who the vice president is when they can watch Lionel Messi carry Argentina to the final and be fairly certain that his doing so was legitimate?
Sports governing bodies do not own a sport, despite their efforts to do so. They run a business to make a profit, but most of the people in such organisations have a genuine interest in the sport they are running. The profits are meant to be put back into the game to raise its quality and quantity. Governing bodies are a necessary evil to ensure that a sport can run well and grow. In a way, they are like churches, evangelising a sport and ensuring its existing communities function well. Given the place sports take in the lives of many, this seems the most appropriate comparison, and perhaps also explain why cheating and corruption are so decried.
Ultimately, the governance of a sport runs almost parallel to sport itself. Professional sportsmen aim for a perfect performance. If you ask a coach like Ross Lyon about how his team performed on the weekend, the inevitable response will be that it was good, but there was room for improvement. There is always room for improvement. No sportsman can achieve a perfect performance, but it doesn't stop them from trying. It should be much the same with governance. The nature of humans means that perfect management is impossible, as there will always be someone, somewhere that looks out for themselves first. But we know what good governance is and we know that we like it, so we should always aim for it, and punish those who prevent it from happening.
For a governing body does not own a sport, but we the fans entrust them with representing it. The law represents us, so when they break the law they are breaking our trust. Let us hope that FIFA learns from this, even though many in the association may well believe that this does not affect them.
Corruption in sporting bodies may not be surprising, but it does genuinely matter.
Thursday 28 May 2015
Thursday 21 May 2015
Are we seeing an Islamic Reformation?
With news coming through that Daesh, the Islamic State, has taken Ramadi in Iraq and Palmyra in Syria, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the coalition of states defending against them is only having a limited impact. For a time, it appeared the tide was turning. But Daesh has adapted to the air strikes and various groups fighting against them on the ground, and is once again on the offensive.
The failure to contain Daesh is surely weighing on the minds of those in charge of defeating them, but for those of us not in that position we cannot help but wonder if our leaders actually understand Daesh yet.
When the Caliphate was proclaimed, the language used to deride it indicated that there was not much understanding of the intention or beliefs of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his followers. Daesh was not merely an insane cult on the fringes of Islam, and as young men (and women) continue to emigrate to their territory, it seems itself insane to continue to call it such.
Academically, there appears to be an increasing recognition that the ideology of Daesh has a significant basis to it, and that it wasn't dreamt up to justify their actions in the past couple of years. The rather unwieldy name being used to describe their ideology is 'Salafi-jihadism'. Salafism has had a few notable scholars in its favour over the years, including Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, from whom the Saudi Wahhabism takes its name. Jihad is, of course, a relatively well known concept, having been used to justify terrorism over past few decades. The combination of this interpretation of Islam and this tenet of Islam appears to have taken root some time in the mid-90s, and it is from this combination that Daesh has come.
In the years to come we may well need to come up with a better name for this ideology, because what it proposes is so radical, yet so internally consistent and therefore so appealing to those it targets, that it is very likely to be hanging around for quite some time to come. We may well be seeing not merely the rise of another strand of Islam, but a genuine Islamic Reformation.
The idea of a reformation for Islam is not a new one. It, and Judaism, have both had within them attempts since the 19th century to reform the religion from the inside, in much the same way Christianity had done in the 16th century. What is curious about both these movements, though, is that they seem to be based around the end result of the Protestant Reformation, not the process. Both Islamic and Jewish reform have been based on the idea of liberalising the religion, and freeing those within it. This has been particularly true of Islam in the West, which has had to juggle the laws of the land in which they live with the laws of the religion they follow. But neither of those reforming movements should really be called a reformation. They do not have the same background to them, and are quite rightly defined as being liberalising movements, rather than actually starting over, as a reformation does.
'Salafi-jihadism' is different. In fact, the similarities (important and trivial) of its occurrence with the Protestant Reformation are somewhat surprising. Let me give a description:
Occurring around 1500 years after the religion's foundation, this movement found its first proponents to the north of the centre of the religion. At first, the movement was mostly ignored, bunched together with other small heresies and the like that had popped up over the years, but thousands began listening to the message being preached, and they became followers. The message they were proclaiming was that the religion had become lost in its ways, and they had to go back to the original texts to understand what God had truly meant for them to be doing. In order to assist them in proclaiming their message, new forms of media which allowed rapid dissemination of texts were used, and their message rapidly spread out from where it had first come.
So, what was I referring to? Well, you could make a good argument either way, and an even better argument that I am referring to both. hat the end result of these two reformations should appear to be so different does not matter in deciding whether or not they are both reformations. The point of a reformation is surely to re-form - to start over, to begin again, to create anew the belief that is meant to be followed. That is what happened in Christianity in the 1500s, and it is what is happening here.
If Islam wishes to combat this reformation, the countries and people must work together to do so. The question, though, is who will lead it. Saudi Arabia isn't interested, as their beliefs aren't too different from Daesh's. Iran is irrelevant, as their Shia Islam is in much the same position as the Eastern Orthodoxies. Turkey is too caught up in its own internal difficulties, with those in the country varying from ardent secularists to Daesh supporters. Nowhere in the region is there one voice that would be willing to lead, as the Vatican was able to, for every country has its own problems. It may be in the end that the western creation of nation-states provides the power vacuum in which the self-proclaimed Caliphate is both created and fills.
Or Daesh may collapse in a year. Who really knows?
The failure to contain Daesh is surely weighing on the minds of those in charge of defeating them, but for those of us not in that position we cannot help but wonder if our leaders actually understand Daesh yet.
When the Caliphate was proclaimed, the language used to deride it indicated that there was not much understanding of the intention or beliefs of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his followers. Daesh was not merely an insane cult on the fringes of Islam, and as young men (and women) continue to emigrate to their territory, it seems itself insane to continue to call it such.
Academically, there appears to be an increasing recognition that the ideology of Daesh has a significant basis to it, and that it wasn't dreamt up to justify their actions in the past couple of years. The rather unwieldy name being used to describe their ideology is 'Salafi-jihadism'. Salafism has had a few notable scholars in its favour over the years, including Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, from whom the Saudi Wahhabism takes its name. Jihad is, of course, a relatively well known concept, having been used to justify terrorism over past few decades. The combination of this interpretation of Islam and this tenet of Islam appears to have taken root some time in the mid-90s, and it is from this combination that Daesh has come.
In the years to come we may well need to come up with a better name for this ideology, because what it proposes is so radical, yet so internally consistent and therefore so appealing to those it targets, that it is very likely to be hanging around for quite some time to come. We may well be seeing not merely the rise of another strand of Islam, but a genuine Islamic Reformation.
The idea of a reformation for Islam is not a new one. It, and Judaism, have both had within them attempts since the 19th century to reform the religion from the inside, in much the same way Christianity had done in the 16th century. What is curious about both these movements, though, is that they seem to be based around the end result of the Protestant Reformation, not the process. Both Islamic and Jewish reform have been based on the idea of liberalising the religion, and freeing those within it. This has been particularly true of Islam in the West, which has had to juggle the laws of the land in which they live with the laws of the religion they follow. But neither of those reforming movements should really be called a reformation. They do not have the same background to them, and are quite rightly defined as being liberalising movements, rather than actually starting over, as a reformation does.
'Salafi-jihadism' is different. In fact, the similarities (important and trivial) of its occurrence with the Protestant Reformation are somewhat surprising. Let me give a description:
Occurring around 1500 years after the religion's foundation, this movement found its first proponents to the north of the centre of the religion. At first, the movement was mostly ignored, bunched together with other small heresies and the like that had popped up over the years, but thousands began listening to the message being preached, and they became followers. The message they were proclaiming was that the religion had become lost in its ways, and they had to go back to the original texts to understand what God had truly meant for them to be doing. In order to assist them in proclaiming their message, new forms of media which allowed rapid dissemination of texts were used, and their message rapidly spread out from where it had first come.
So, what was I referring to? Well, you could make a good argument either way, and an even better argument that I am referring to both. hat the end result of these two reformations should appear to be so different does not matter in deciding whether or not they are both reformations. The point of a reformation is surely to re-form - to start over, to begin again, to create anew the belief that is meant to be followed. That is what happened in Christianity in the 1500s, and it is what is happening here.
If Islam wishes to combat this reformation, the countries and people must work together to do so. The question, though, is who will lead it. Saudi Arabia isn't interested, as their beliefs aren't too different from Daesh's. Iran is irrelevant, as their Shia Islam is in much the same position as the Eastern Orthodoxies. Turkey is too caught up in its own internal difficulties, with those in the country varying from ardent secularists to Daesh supporters. Nowhere in the region is there one voice that would be willing to lead, as the Vatican was able to, for every country has its own problems. It may be in the end that the western creation of nation-states provides the power vacuum in which the self-proclaimed Caliphate is both created and fills.
Or Daesh may collapse in a year. Who really knows?
Saturday 16 May 2015
The struggle for UKIP
Losing an election is never a nice feeling, and it's no great surprise that political parties tend to go through mini-revolutions following election losses. UKIP appears to be no different - and, being UKIP, it has naturally been magnified by absolutely everyone.
UKIP faces two fundamental issues, one short term and one long term. The first struggle is that of leadership. Calling Nigel Farage the face of UKIP feels like an understatement, so large is the imprint he has on the party. However, the circumstances of his non-resignation have brought murmurings of discontent from some quarters. Did he do the right thing? Should he have stepped down anyway? Who would take over? Is he the right leader at this point in time? All these questions have been addressed in a myriad of different ways, sometimes without the careful forethought required when asking these questions publicly.
The Farage question is particularly important given the possibility of the EU referendum being held in a year from now, rather than two or three. UKIP, who would no doubt be spearheading the out campaign, needs to be campaigning for that result fairly soon if that is the case, which means their leader is going to need a lot of energy. Whether Farage has the energy, and the ability to convince undecideds, is an important issue. There's no doubt Farage would dearly like a holiday, but now it looks as though he'll get no such thing - unless others in the party force him to.
The other problem with leadership is that it tends to affect the future of the party well after the leader has gone. Nick Clegg's coalition decision may well mean years in the wilderness for the Liberal Democrats. If Farage takes the party in the wrong direction, it could all have been for naught.
This brings about the second, probably more important struggle. It is one of ideology. What is it that UKIP believes and stands for?
The primary goal of UKIP is to leave the European Union. That has been the case from day dot. But that single belief spans every direction of the political spectrum, and the populism that Farage has so expertly promoted has resulted in large swathes of members joining the party with vastly different beliefs to each other. As long as the EU is an issue, this will only bubble beneath the surface. But the current leadership dilemma has already resulted in some internal comments that UKIP faces an ideological split.
While Farage and MP Douglas Carswell are broadly speaking libertarians (the kind of people who would've joined the Liberal Party before its awkward ideological merger with the Social Democrats), many in the party are not. Some amongst them are classic conservatives who recognise the importance of the European Union in deciding British policy, and are railing against it until the UK returns to being independent from the EU. In this way they often also seek to restore and celebrate British culture. Others are old Labour voters, frustrated by their dislocation from the Labour party of today, a party that has accepted the basics tenets of neoliberalism and mass immigration without seeming to care than their old base were the ones most affected by the changes these policies brought about. Others still are social conservatives who are also concerned with the same issues as old Labour - for lack of a better word, communitarians.
As it stands today, UKIP has members from all corners of the political spectrum, all of which can argue to best represent the ideology the party should embody. But in the long run, it's difficult to see them all working together perpetually. There are too many ideological differences to overcome once the EU issue is decided. At least, there are if UKIP intends to be a major party at some point, which they undoubtedly should.
Most likely is that either the libertarians or the communitarians will win out. Of course, the fact that these two ideologies are more or less opposite to each other makes it difficult to see how there wouldn't be a large split at some point. The Liberal Democrats at least have some similarities between the classic liberals and social democrats that make up the party.
In any case, UKIP should be a considerable figure in British politics for the forseeable future. If they fail, they will have done a great disservice to politics in the United Kingdom, for right now they stand, above all, as the party of the people.
UKIP faces two fundamental issues, one short term and one long term. The first struggle is that of leadership. Calling Nigel Farage the face of UKIP feels like an understatement, so large is the imprint he has on the party. However, the circumstances of his non-resignation have brought murmurings of discontent from some quarters. Did he do the right thing? Should he have stepped down anyway? Who would take over? Is he the right leader at this point in time? All these questions have been addressed in a myriad of different ways, sometimes without the careful forethought required when asking these questions publicly.
The Farage question is particularly important given the possibility of the EU referendum being held in a year from now, rather than two or three. UKIP, who would no doubt be spearheading the out campaign, needs to be campaigning for that result fairly soon if that is the case, which means their leader is going to need a lot of energy. Whether Farage has the energy, and the ability to convince undecideds, is an important issue. There's no doubt Farage would dearly like a holiday, but now it looks as though he'll get no such thing - unless others in the party force him to.
The other problem with leadership is that it tends to affect the future of the party well after the leader has gone. Nick Clegg's coalition decision may well mean years in the wilderness for the Liberal Democrats. If Farage takes the party in the wrong direction, it could all have been for naught.
This brings about the second, probably more important struggle. It is one of ideology. What is it that UKIP believes and stands for?
The primary goal of UKIP is to leave the European Union. That has been the case from day dot. But that single belief spans every direction of the political spectrum, and the populism that Farage has so expertly promoted has resulted in large swathes of members joining the party with vastly different beliefs to each other. As long as the EU is an issue, this will only bubble beneath the surface. But the current leadership dilemma has already resulted in some internal comments that UKIP faces an ideological split.
While Farage and MP Douglas Carswell are broadly speaking libertarians (the kind of people who would've joined the Liberal Party before its awkward ideological merger with the Social Democrats), many in the party are not. Some amongst them are classic conservatives who recognise the importance of the European Union in deciding British policy, and are railing against it until the UK returns to being independent from the EU. In this way they often also seek to restore and celebrate British culture. Others are old Labour voters, frustrated by their dislocation from the Labour party of today, a party that has accepted the basics tenets of neoliberalism and mass immigration without seeming to care than their old base were the ones most affected by the changes these policies brought about. Others still are social conservatives who are also concerned with the same issues as old Labour - for lack of a better word, communitarians.
As it stands today, UKIP has members from all corners of the political spectrum, all of which can argue to best represent the ideology the party should embody. But in the long run, it's difficult to see them all working together perpetually. There are too many ideological differences to overcome once the EU issue is decided. At least, there are if UKIP intends to be a major party at some point, which they undoubtedly should.
Most likely is that either the libertarians or the communitarians will win out. Of course, the fact that these two ideologies are more or less opposite to each other makes it difficult to see how there wouldn't be a large split at some point. The Liberal Democrats at least have some similarities between the classic liberals and social democrats that make up the party.
In any case, UKIP should be a considerable figure in British politics for the forseeable future. If they fail, they will have done a great disservice to politics in the United Kingdom, for right now they stand, above all, as the party of the people.
Saturday 9 May 2015
The story of the Liberal Demolition
When the exit poll came through on Thursday night, telling us that the Liberal Democrats would only win ten seats, no-one could quite believe it. Paddy Ashdown was so surprised by the prediction that he promised he would eat his hat were it true.
After all, the pollsters has been speculating for months that the Lib Dems would end up with between 25 and 30 seats. Surely the Lib Dem support wouldn't totally collapse in so many of their seats.
In the end, the exit poll wasn't quite right. The Lib Dems ended up with eight seats, their worst result since the Liberal Party earned six seats in 1970. There was no favour for incumbents, not even for long standing MPs, or those serving in the Cabinet.
Vince Cable is gone. Danny Alexander is gone. Ed Davey, Simon Hughes, David Laws and 44 others are all out the door, punished by the electorate for their party's role in government. Those that are left are spread around the country. There's one in six of the nine regions of England, along with one in Wales and one in Scotland, the latter being the old Liberal territory of Orkney and Shetland. The region generally regarded as the closest thing the Liberals had to a region of their own, the South West, now is entirely blue with a little bit of red.
Nick Clegg, one of the few survivors, has quit the leadership. Tim Farron is tipped to be the next leader, purely because he's the only one that many are familiar with. With a Conservative majority government, and a dominant SNP, the Lib Dems have little relevance inside the Commons, and with 1.4 million less votes than UKIP, not much relevance outside it.
How did it all come to this?
A loss of seats was inevitable. The Lib Dems have long been a party that has to work harder to get seats that the big two, so when their polling fell it was guaranteed that their seat loss would be fairly large. But the pollsters still thought there would be an incumbency effect, and that the high profile Lib Dems would just hold on. This was based on specific Ashcroft polling, which indicated that the overall perception of Lib Dems was worse across the country that it was in Lib Dem held seats that looked like becoming marginal.
As fivethirtyeight has explained, incumbency did not matter. Predictions that used the broad Lib Dem numbers proved much closer to reality, but no-one made them. What this does suggest is that the electorate's dismay with the Lib Dems was greater than any personal support they felt for their local member.
Why?
The other thing to keep in mind is that the Lib Dem's support over the years has been built on a small base and a significant protest vote. People that vote for the Lib Dems in one election have historically been likely to move to one of the other major parties, with those voters being replaced in the Lib Dem support base by other disaffected voters. The Lib Dems did not attract any of this support this time around, as they were now a party of government with the Conservatives, annoying traditional voters of both major parties for different reasons. Beyond their core of 8%, voters had no reason to pick them as the protest vote.
Traditional Labour voters went back to a Labour party that appealed to them, attempting to ditch the image of New Labour. Traditional Conservative voters had no reason to vote for the minor member of a coalition that had prevented the Tories from making certain policy decisions, and shifting voters felt similarly. Disaffected voters now had one other significant option: UKIP. UKIP made sure everyone knew that they weren't simply attracting old Tories - they were attracting old Labour too. Finally, the SNP and the Greens presented a reputable alternative to Labour for those annoyed at the Lib Dems for enabling a Conservative government. Other than classic and social liberals, what reason was there to vote Lib Dem?
Their campaign tried to emphasise their ability to be a coalition partner with either of the major parties, but in the end voters preferred having a majority government (though not by much). The reputation of the Lib Dems suffered so much from the controversial government decision on tuition fees, and the appearance of going along with the Tories budget decisions, that any hope of appealing to voters beyond their core base completely vanished years ago.
It's now a long road back to appealing to the electorate. First, they have to figure out who they are. One potential saving grace for them is that we may be near the end of first past the post, which may give them a way back in. But even then, that is unlikely to expand their base, which they need to do if they ever want to revive the cause of liberalism as being truly significant in modern Britain.
After all, the pollsters has been speculating for months that the Lib Dems would end up with between 25 and 30 seats. Surely the Lib Dem support wouldn't totally collapse in so many of their seats.
In the end, the exit poll wasn't quite right. The Lib Dems ended up with eight seats, their worst result since the Liberal Party earned six seats in 1970. There was no favour for incumbents, not even for long standing MPs, or those serving in the Cabinet.
Vince Cable is gone. Danny Alexander is gone. Ed Davey, Simon Hughes, David Laws and 44 others are all out the door, punished by the electorate for their party's role in government. Those that are left are spread around the country. There's one in six of the nine regions of England, along with one in Wales and one in Scotland, the latter being the old Liberal territory of Orkney and Shetland. The region generally regarded as the closest thing the Liberals had to a region of their own, the South West, now is entirely blue with a little bit of red.
Nick Clegg, one of the few survivors, has quit the leadership. Tim Farron is tipped to be the next leader, purely because he's the only one that many are familiar with. With a Conservative majority government, and a dominant SNP, the Lib Dems have little relevance inside the Commons, and with 1.4 million less votes than UKIP, not much relevance outside it.
How did it all come to this?
A loss of seats was inevitable. The Lib Dems have long been a party that has to work harder to get seats that the big two, so when their polling fell it was guaranteed that their seat loss would be fairly large. But the pollsters still thought there would be an incumbency effect, and that the high profile Lib Dems would just hold on. This was based on specific Ashcroft polling, which indicated that the overall perception of Lib Dems was worse across the country that it was in Lib Dem held seats that looked like becoming marginal.
As fivethirtyeight has explained, incumbency did not matter. Predictions that used the broad Lib Dem numbers proved much closer to reality, but no-one made them. What this does suggest is that the electorate's dismay with the Lib Dems was greater than any personal support they felt for their local member.
Why?
The other thing to keep in mind is that the Lib Dem's support over the years has been built on a small base and a significant protest vote. People that vote for the Lib Dems in one election have historically been likely to move to one of the other major parties, with those voters being replaced in the Lib Dem support base by other disaffected voters. The Lib Dems did not attract any of this support this time around, as they were now a party of government with the Conservatives, annoying traditional voters of both major parties for different reasons. Beyond their core of 8%, voters had no reason to pick them as the protest vote.
Traditional Labour voters went back to a Labour party that appealed to them, attempting to ditch the image of New Labour. Traditional Conservative voters had no reason to vote for the minor member of a coalition that had prevented the Tories from making certain policy decisions, and shifting voters felt similarly. Disaffected voters now had one other significant option: UKIP. UKIP made sure everyone knew that they weren't simply attracting old Tories - they were attracting old Labour too. Finally, the SNP and the Greens presented a reputable alternative to Labour for those annoyed at the Lib Dems for enabling a Conservative government. Other than classic and social liberals, what reason was there to vote Lib Dem?
Their campaign tried to emphasise their ability to be a coalition partner with either of the major parties, but in the end voters preferred having a majority government (though not by much). The reputation of the Lib Dems suffered so much from the controversial government decision on tuition fees, and the appearance of going along with the Tories budget decisions, that any hope of appealing to voters beyond their core base completely vanished years ago.
It's now a long road back to appealing to the electorate. First, they have to figure out who they are. One potential saving grace for them is that we may be near the end of first past the post, which may give them a way back in. But even then, that is unlikely to expand their base, which they need to do if they ever want to revive the cause of liberalism as being truly significant in modern Britain.
Thursday 7 May 2015
D-Day for the UK
Elections can be mixed events. Election junkies, for lack of a better term, spend weeks in fascination as the now-daily polls come in, gauging the mood of the electorate. Sometimes, this can lead up to an exciting election with close polls. Other times, it leads to a straightforward affair with one party clearly dominating. This has especially been the case in two-party democracies - basically the entire English speaking world.
The last UK election threw a spanner in the works by forcing a coalition to be made, something their continental European cousins are very much used to. Now the next UK general election is upon us, and things are looking even less clear, and therefore even more interesting. Labour and the Conservatives are basically tied in the national polls, and three minor parties are polling between 15 and 5%. The Scottish Nationalists are on track to win all but a few Scottish seats. The only certainty seems to be that everything is very uncertain.
This is not due to a particularly inspiring campaign from all sides. Quite the opposite, actually, with every party - especially the older ones - seeking to stage manage the weeks running up to the vote as much as possible. The entire western world seems increasingly disconnected with politics, and this theme was writ large throughout the campaign, being brought up by both the media (who are partly at fault for the disconnection in the first place) and the public.
The work of Lord Ashcroft in getting individual electorate polling going throughout the campaign, at his own expense and to sate his own curiosity, has added a useful dimension to the campaign. Unlike in a multi-member proportional parliament, single member districts each come with their own unique situation, and often those situation weren't spelt out until the election had already happened. Being able to track the closeness of individual key seats has made predictions more accurate...we think.
Polling is a notoriously complex dilemma, if for no other reason than we don't know what impact they have on people's decisions. Nevertheless, in theory they have been of great value. We shall have to wait and see how true that turns out to be.
Just as interesting as the result is what happens afterwards. Should it turn out to be the multi-party parliament it promises to be, beholden to the SNP, figuring out who governs may take far longer than the British are used to. The most likely scenario, though, given Labour's strategy, is that a Labour/Lib Dem coalition governs with the SNP given them confidence. This allows them to have a plurality over the larger Tories, thus giving them 'legitimacy', which has been another big question over the past month. What role UKIP can play remains to be seen. Labour and the Lib Dems are uneasy with the idea of a referendum on leaving the EU, and the Conservatives can wipe their hands of it should they not take office.
So, with that, here's my mostly unprofessional and full of guessing prediction:
Conservatives: 276
Labour: 264
Liberal Democrats: 29
UKIP: 4
SNP: 54
Green: 1
Other: 22
Whatever happens, what will be confirmed is that the people have had enough of two-party politics. It is up to each party to earn the respect and support of the people by listening to them. UKIP and the SNP have both done this, albeit in different ways. The others will need to do similar in the future.
The last UK election threw a spanner in the works by forcing a coalition to be made, something their continental European cousins are very much used to. Now the next UK general election is upon us, and things are looking even less clear, and therefore even more interesting. Labour and the Conservatives are basically tied in the national polls, and three minor parties are polling between 15 and 5%. The Scottish Nationalists are on track to win all but a few Scottish seats. The only certainty seems to be that everything is very uncertain.
This is not due to a particularly inspiring campaign from all sides. Quite the opposite, actually, with every party - especially the older ones - seeking to stage manage the weeks running up to the vote as much as possible. The entire western world seems increasingly disconnected with politics, and this theme was writ large throughout the campaign, being brought up by both the media (who are partly at fault for the disconnection in the first place) and the public.
The work of Lord Ashcroft in getting individual electorate polling going throughout the campaign, at his own expense and to sate his own curiosity, has added a useful dimension to the campaign. Unlike in a multi-member proportional parliament, single member districts each come with their own unique situation, and often those situation weren't spelt out until the election had already happened. Being able to track the closeness of individual key seats has made predictions more accurate...we think.
Polling is a notoriously complex dilemma, if for no other reason than we don't know what impact they have on people's decisions. Nevertheless, in theory they have been of great value. We shall have to wait and see how true that turns out to be.
Just as interesting as the result is what happens afterwards. Should it turn out to be the multi-party parliament it promises to be, beholden to the SNP, figuring out who governs may take far longer than the British are used to. The most likely scenario, though, given Labour's strategy, is that a Labour/Lib Dem coalition governs with the SNP given them confidence. This allows them to have a plurality over the larger Tories, thus giving them 'legitimacy', which has been another big question over the past month. What role UKIP can play remains to be seen. Labour and the Lib Dems are uneasy with the idea of a referendum on leaving the EU, and the Conservatives can wipe their hands of it should they not take office.
So, with that, here's my mostly unprofessional and full of guessing prediction:
Conservatives: 276
Labour: 264
Liberal Democrats: 29
UKIP: 4
SNP: 54
Green: 1
Other: 22
Whatever happens, what will be confirmed is that the people have had enough of two-party politics. It is up to each party to earn the respect and support of the people by listening to them. UKIP and the SNP have both done this, albeit in different ways. The others will need to do similar in the future.
Friday 1 May 2015
The strategy behind Labour's rejection of the SNP
During his grilling on Question Time, Ed Miliband once again flatly denied the possibility of Labour forming a government with the Scottish National Party, whether it be a coalition or a 'deal'.
Now he has confirmed that Labour is taking a similar approach to Plaid Cymru.
This, on the surface, seems like a poor position to take. Labour is highly unlikely to gain a majority on its own, and the direction of the polls is such that it's unlikely a Labour + Liberal Democrat coalition would have enough seats either. A prospective Labour government will need these at least one of these nationalist, social democratic parties onside. Neither of these parties even wants to consider a Conservative government, and both have offered Labour the possibility of a deal.
Yet Ed Miliband says no. Why?
Well, consider the two regions in question. Scotland is in the midst of deep nationalist sentiment, but the sentiment felt now got underway with Thatcherism, which obliterated the Scottish Conservatives. Labour has had a stranglehold on the nation for decades, along with a relatively strong Liberal undercurrent. The Conservatives hold only one seat in the country, and aren't going to be winning more. The problem for Labour is that the SNP have successfully connected independence with their party, and are riding the nationalist wave over Labour's majority. The SNP are on track to win up to 50 seats in Scotland, leaving Labour and the Lib Dems fighting for the scraps. Wales has not quite the same national fervour, despite Plaid Cymru's best efforts, but it is still a Labour stronghold. In both cases, Labour is desperate to hold on to as many seats as possible, as they look to maximise their English gains.
So where is the logic behind denying the possibility of a deal with these parties? It seems that Labour's strategy is to implore voters to come back to Labour, and away from the nationalists, because Labour can guarantee stability, and can guarantee that the Tories won't come back. The constituencies for Labour and the nationalists are much the same, and their policies are much the same. The problem for Labour is that nationalism is winning over enough of the population to make Labour look unattractive by comparison. Nicola Sturgeon's party has used public sentiment enormously well, and is presumably fairly confident of being the king maker in the Commons.
This may also explain the other reason for Labour's denials. They are sure that the Conservatives can't possibly form a coalition, and want to try to use this seat maximising policy for as long as the can, knowing they'll get into government anyway. If that does turn out to be the case, though, they'll have forgotten that lying to voters isn't generally a good way to stay in power, and is especially not a good way to start. To promise that they won't deal with the SNP or Plaid Cymru, only to turn around and do so immediately after the polls close, would immediately attach the word 'untrustworthy' to a party that can ill afford it.
After all, what was the primary focus of the questions on Question Time towards the party leaders?
It was, quite simply, trust.
Now he has confirmed that Labour is taking a similar approach to Plaid Cymru.
This, on the surface, seems like a poor position to take. Labour is highly unlikely to gain a majority on its own, and the direction of the polls is such that it's unlikely a Labour + Liberal Democrat coalition would have enough seats either. A prospective Labour government will need these at least one of these nationalist, social democratic parties onside. Neither of these parties even wants to consider a Conservative government, and both have offered Labour the possibility of a deal.
Yet Ed Miliband says no. Why?
Well, consider the two regions in question. Scotland is in the midst of deep nationalist sentiment, but the sentiment felt now got underway with Thatcherism, which obliterated the Scottish Conservatives. Labour has had a stranglehold on the nation for decades, along with a relatively strong Liberal undercurrent. The Conservatives hold only one seat in the country, and aren't going to be winning more. The problem for Labour is that the SNP have successfully connected independence with their party, and are riding the nationalist wave over Labour's majority. The SNP are on track to win up to 50 seats in Scotland, leaving Labour and the Lib Dems fighting for the scraps. Wales has not quite the same national fervour, despite Plaid Cymru's best efforts, but it is still a Labour stronghold. In both cases, Labour is desperate to hold on to as many seats as possible, as they look to maximise their English gains.
So where is the logic behind denying the possibility of a deal with these parties? It seems that Labour's strategy is to implore voters to come back to Labour, and away from the nationalists, because Labour can guarantee stability, and can guarantee that the Tories won't come back. The constituencies for Labour and the nationalists are much the same, and their policies are much the same. The problem for Labour is that nationalism is winning over enough of the population to make Labour look unattractive by comparison. Nicola Sturgeon's party has used public sentiment enormously well, and is presumably fairly confident of being the king maker in the Commons.
This may also explain the other reason for Labour's denials. They are sure that the Conservatives can't possibly form a coalition, and want to try to use this seat maximising policy for as long as the can, knowing they'll get into government anyway. If that does turn out to be the case, though, they'll have forgotten that lying to voters isn't generally a good way to stay in power, and is especially not a good way to start. To promise that they won't deal with the SNP or Plaid Cymru, only to turn around and do so immediately after the polls close, would immediately attach the word 'untrustworthy' to a party that can ill afford it.
After all, what was the primary focus of the questions on Question Time towards the party leaders?
It was, quite simply, trust.
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